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OPINION OF THE COURT
__________
PER CURIAM.
1By order dated February 14, 2002, the District Court sua sponte consolidated the
Berg litigation with the Acceptance coverage litigation under Civil Action No. 00-CV-05075.
The District Court subsequently unconsolidated the cases.    
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Acceptance Insurance Company (“Acceptance”), brought an action seeking a
declaratory judgment that it has no duty to defend or indemnify Hull Corporation
(“Hull”), and SP Industries, Inc., d/b/a Hull Company (“SPI”), with respect to potential
liability in Berg Chilling Sys., Inc. v. Hull Corp., E.D. Pa. Civil Action No. 00-5075, (the
“Berg litigation”).  The District Court consolidated this action with the Berg litigation on
January 14, 2002.1  After initially ruling that Acceptance had a duty to defend its insured,
the District Court reconsidered its decision and ruled that Acceptance has no duty to
defend or indemnify and entered a judgment of dismissal.  Hull now appeals the
judgment.  We reverse and remand for proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
I.  BACKGROUND
A.  Procedural History
On October 6, 2000, Berg Chilling Systems Inc. (“Berg”), sued Hull for
indemnification of a $1.7 million international arbitration award against Berg by Beijing
Huadu Meat Products Company (“Huadu”), based on a contract between Berg and Huadu
for the supply of equipment for producing dehydrated beef products.  Berg joined SPI,
which had previously purchased some of Hull’s assets.  In its first amended complaint,
Berg alleged that Hull and SPI were liable to Berg for indemnification or contribution of
the arbitration award, based on Hull’s breach of contract and warranty in connection with
2For the purposes of this opinion, we have omitted a description of Hull’s and SPI’s
respective Third-Party Complaints against Third-Party Defendants and Cross-Claims by
Third-Party Defendants.
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its contract to supply certain freeze drying equipment to Berg for eventual supply to
Huadu.  Hull and SPI cross-claimed against each other for indemnity and contribution.2
Acceptance issued to Hull a Commercial General Liability Insurance Policy
(“Policy”), effective April 21, 1994, and reissued virtually identical policies annually,
extending coverage until April 21, 1999.  Under the Policy, coverage is afforded only to
bodily injury or property damage “which occurs within the policy territory during the
policy.”
On September 20, 2000, Hull sent a letter to Acceptance requesting defense and
indemnification in the Berg litigation.  Acceptance denied coverage under the Policy.  On
February 7, 2001, Acceptance filed a Complaint in Declaratory Judgment, amended
February 20, 2001, in which Acceptance sought a declaration that it is required neither to
defend nor indemnify Hull for any losses resulting from the Berg litigation.  Acceptance
claimed that (1) the property damage alleged by Berg does not constitute an “occurrence”
under the Policy; (2) any alleged occurrences did not occur within the “policy territory”;
and (3) Hull’s claim is barred by the specific exclusions of the Policy.  Hull responded by
arguing that its product, freeze dryer equipment, was damaged by a combination of (1) a
road incident during cross-continental shipment by Berg before shipment to Huadu; (2)
Huadu’s failure to supply clean cooling water and an automated monorail at its facility;
5and (3) the failure of system components to work during start-up testing at Huadu’s
facility, affecting the entire system.  Hull contended that property damage resulting from
these incidents is covered by the Policy, that its claim falls within the “policy territory,”
and that the Policy exclusions do not apply.
The District Court considered these arguments and ruled on January 14, 2002, that
Acceptance had a duty to defend its insured in the Berg litigation.  The Court based its
decision on allegations of negligence in the pleadings, specifically, on SPI’s counter-
cross-claim which contained an allegation of negligence.  The District Court also
concluded that any alleged property damage occurred within the “policy territory,” and
Acceptance had not met its burden of showing that any of the exclusions apply to
preclude coverage under the Policy.
Acceptance then moved for reconsideration of that decision.  In an April 2, 2002
decision, the Court recognized that “[a]lthough the parties have not provided any new
evidence, they have supplemented the record with extensive briefs.”  Convinced that its
previous decision was “in error as a matter of law,” the District Court reversed itself and
determined that Acceptance had no duty to defend or indemnify Hull.  In reaching its
decision, the Court applied the “gist of the action” test under Pennsylvania law.  This test
required the Court to ask whether the underlying lawsuit sounds primarily either in tort or
in contract.  The Court determined that the underlying dispute among Berg, Hull and SPI
6concerns the allocation of damages arising from alleged breaches of contract and
warranty.  As such, this contract-based liability sounds not in tort, but in contract.
Hull Corporation filed a Notice of Appeal from the trial court’s April 2, 2002 order
granting Acceptance’s motion for relief from judgment, and from the Court’s April 19,
2002 order granting the withdrawal of Acceptance’s appointed counsel for Hull. 
Acceptance’s appointed counsel, Billet & Connor, intervenes in this appeal asking that we
dismiss Hull’s appeal of the April 19 order on the grounds that Hull is no longer pursuing
it.  
B.  Factual History
In 1995, Berg entered into a $2.8 million equipment contract with Huadu to supply
a large food processing system.  Pursuant to a purchase order dated April 20, 1995, Hull
sold $1,150,000 in freeze dryer equipment to Berg for incorporation into the larger food
processing system Berg contracted to provide to Huadu.  In addition to Hull, Berg
contracted with five other major suppliers of component parts for the system.  
Pursuant to its contract with Huadu, Berg assumed sole responsibility for shipping
all of the component parts to Huadu’s production facility in Beijing.  During Berg’s
transportation of the Hull freeze dryer components from the East Coast of the United
States to Vancouver, Canada, the transporter was involved in a road accident.  The
equipment contract between Huadu and Berg contemplated that ratification by both
parties would be obtained on or before April 30, 1995.  Due to delays, however, Berg and
3Hull alleges that the platen racks were damaged again in early 1998.
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Huadu entered into a subsequent agreement (“the amending agreement”), which amended
the equipment contract with respect to the delivery dates of the equipment, including the
Hull freeze dryer equipment.
During initial start-up testing of the freeze drying system in 1997, Huadu
discovered a series of problems, including damage to, and non-conformity of, the heat
platen racks.3  Hull also claims that during product testing Huadu failed to provide a clean
cooling water supply, which resulted in contamination and failure of the refrigeration
compressors.  
Huadu eventually complained to Berg about the series of damages and delays, and
claimed that the system could not be successfully operated.  In connection with the Huadu
complaints, Berg, Hull and Huadu entered into a new agreement, dated October 8, 1997,
(“the modified agreement”).  Thereafter, however, Huadu rejected the entire food
processing system, including the freeze drying system provided by Hull.
On March 29, 1999, Huadu submitted an Arbitration Claim against Berg to the
Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce.  The Arbitration panel
found in favor of Huadu.  Berg twice requested that Hull participate in the arbitration
proceedings as a defendant along with Berg.  Hull did not participate in the arbitration
proceedings.  
C.  Additional Developments
8In January 2003, the underlying Berg litigation went to trial before the District
Court.  Hull claims that documents and testimony from that trial support its allegations of
“occurrences” under the Policy.  Hull has made some of these items available to the panel
for review in the form of an addendum to the joint appendix.
At oral argument in this matter, the panel requested post-argument memoranda
addressing the question of the extent to which this Court may look to the record, beyond
the first amended complaint, to assess whether there was an “occurrence” which would
require Acceptance to defend Hull in the lawsuit brought by Berg.  The panel also
requested that counsel address whether the delay in delivering the freeze dryer system
could result in damages which would qualify as an “occurrence” under the Policy, and
discuss any issue that might be addressed usefully by the District Court if the case is
remanded.  
II.  DISCUSSION
A.  Dismissal of Intervenor
As a preliminary matter, we dismiss Hull’s appeal of the District Court’s April 19,
2002 order permitting Billet & Connor to withdraw as counsel.  In its brief, Hull does not
mention the April 19 order or make any argument that the April 19 order should be
reversed.  We conclude that Hull has abandoned this issue on appeal and we dismiss it.
B.  The Duty to Defend
9The parties agree that the insurance contract is governed by Pennsylvania law.  See
Frog, Switch & Mfg. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 742, 746 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing
Travelers Indem. Co. v. Fantozzi ex rel. Fantozzi, 825 F. Supp. 80, 84 (E.D. Pa. 1993)
(Pennsylvania conflict of laws principles dictate that an insurance contract is guided by
the law of the state in which it is delivered)).
We will apply the general rules of insurance contract construction and read the
Policy as a whole and construe it according to its plain meaning.  “An insurer’s duty to
defend an insured in litigation is broader than the duty to indemnify, in that the former
duty arises whenever an underlying complaint may ‘potentially’ come within the
insurance coverage.”  Id (citing Erie Ins. Exch. v. Claypoole, 449 Pa. Super. 142, 673
A.2d 348, 355 (1996)).  In resolving this appeal, we will only consider Acceptance’s duty
to defend.      
Under the applicable law, an insurer’s duty to defend arises whenever the
allegations in a complaint filed against the insured potentially fall within the policy’s
coverage.  Lucker Mfg., Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 808, 813 (3d Cir. 1994).  The
burden remains with the insurer unless the insurer is able to demonstrate that the
complaint alleges factual liability which, if proved, does not fall within the scope of the
policy.  Id. (citing Stidham v. Millvale Sportsmen’s Club, 421 Pa. Super. 548, 618 A.2d
945, 953-54 (1992) (if indemnification depends upon the existence or nonexistence of
disputed facts, the insurer has a duty to defend until the claim is narrowed to one patently
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outside the policy coverage)).  “In determining the existence of a duty to defend, the
factual allegations of the underlying complaint against the insured are to be taken as true
and liberally construed in favor of the insured.”  Frog, Switch, 193 F.3d at 746.  
In Lucker, we explained: “The underlying complaint need not track the policy
language for there to be coverage: under the liberal rules of notice pleading, [the]
complaint need[] only to indicate the type of litigation involved so that the defendant
would have fair notice of the claim and its defenses.”  Lucker, 23 F.3d at 814.  In that
case, the complaint’s failure to include “magic words” did not relieve the insurer of its
duty to defend.  See id. (explaining that plaintiff’s decision not to include “loss of use” or
“tangible property” in the complaint does not relieve the insurer of its duty to defend). 
Similarly, Pennsylvania’s courts have taken a relatively broad view in discerning
whether a complaint triggers the insurer’s duty to defend.  In Heffernan & Co. v. Hartford
Ins. Co., 418 Pa. Super. 326, 614 A.2d 295 (1992), the Superior Court concluded that a
reviewing court may determine a duty to defend by supplementing the facts alleged in the
complaint with discovery responses.  The Heffernan Court recognized the complaint at
issue sought relief that did not trigger the duty to defend; however, when the parties filed
answers to interrogatories, “the potential for liability became apparent” and the insurer
incurred a duty to defend.  614 A.2d at 332.  At the time of the Court’s decision, the
complaint had not been amended to reflect the discovery answers.  Nonetheless, the Court
concluded that the insurer had an obligation to enter an appearance on behalf of its
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insured and defend the action because a complaint can be amended to state an additional
damage claim at any time prior to final judgment.  The Court also relied on the fact that
the parties were on notice that a claim triggering the duty to defend could be made in the
underlying action.  
In its April 2, 2002 reconsideration of the duty to defend issue, the District Court
did not consider any of the foregoing case law.  Instead, the Court relied upon a
Pennsylvania case, Redevelopment Auth. of Cambria County v. International Ins. Co.,
454 Pa. Super. 374, 390-92, 685 A.2d 581, 589-90 (1996), which formulated a “gist of
the action” test.  Under this test, if the underlying claim arises out of and is based upon
duties imposed by contract between the parties, the claim does not trigger coverage under
a general liability insurance policy.  See id.  
At oral argument, both parties conceded that the District Court erred in applying
this test under Pennsylvania law.  The test has not been adopted by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court and it does not comport with the case law of this Circuit.  We have made
clear that a court undertaking a duty to defend coverage analysis should not rely entirely
upon whether a plaintiff characterizes its claim as one arising in tort or contract.  Under
Pennsylvania law, breach of warranty claims have been held to sound in tort.  See
Montgomery County v. Microvote Corp., 320 F.3d 440, 450 n.4 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing
Williams v. West Penn Power Co., 467 A.2d 811, 817 (Pa. 1983)).  
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We decline to resolve the issue of whether a qualified occurrence exists and
whether the underlying Berg litigation pleadings were sufficient to trigger a duty to
defend because the District Court has not had an opportunity to consider these matters. 
Instead, we remand to the District Court with instructions to consider Hull’s argument
that there were three separate occurrences: (1) the road accident that caused damage to the
freeze dryers and Berg’s failure to repair the damage; (2) the negligent modification work
done on the Hull freeze dryers by SPI; and (3) the dirty water, steam, and nitrogen
provided by Huadu over an eighteen-month period.  The District Court should also
consider whether it can look beyond the four corners of the complaint to determine
whether there was an occurrence.
III.  CONCLUSION
We reverse and remand this case to the District Court to reconsider and determine




Please file the foregoing opinion.
 Circuit Judge
DATED:
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